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More and younger immigrants cannot, on their own, offset the impact
of low past fertility on Canadian workforce growth, old-age
dependency, and incomes per person. Later retirement, higher fertility,
and faster productivity growth are more powerful tools to ease the
stress of demographic change on Canadian living standards.
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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONFor Canadians to expect more, younger immigrants to counteract the effects of low
past fertility on workforce growth and aging would be a serious mistake. While
immigration has been a key driver of Canadian population growth, it cannot, on its
own, offset demographic trends that threaten our future living standards. 
Current fertility and immigration rates, moderately rising life expectancy and
historical productivity growth can be expected to depress workforce growth, boost
the ratio of Canadians 65 and over to those of working age (the old-age dependency
ratio) and depress growth in incomes per person. Despite some popular
commentary, offsetting or even noticeably mitigating these trends would require
unrealistic increases in immigration. 
• Only improbably huge increases – for example, near-term, net immigration
rates more than 2.5 times those of the recent past – could offset the impact of
lower past fertility on workforce growth.
￿ Even huge increases and extreme age filters favoring younger workers could only
slow the coming increase in Canada’s old-age dependency ratio. The terminal
populations in projections where immigration is used to control the ratio range
from over 60 million to over 200 million.
￿ Most striking are the weak projected results of using immigration to maintain
growth of output per person. Forecasts tend to produce explosive population
growth, with ludicrous terminal numbers in the billions or even trillions.
Major policy reforms aimed at mitigating the impact of a slower-growing and aging
population on Canada’s workforce and incomes hold at least as much promise as
changes to immigration. Delaying the normal age of retirement could help both
workforce growth and old-age dependency in the near term. Higher fertility would
help achieve both goals in the next generation and beyond, and faster productivity
growth would boost real incomes per person more than any conceivable
immigration strategy.
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C
anadians increasingly worry that
demographic change threatens
their future living standards.
This concern is well placed: declining
fertility and rising life expectancy are
exerting powerful pressure on the
growth and age structure of Canada’s
population.
Current fertility and immigration rates, moderately
rising life expectancy and historical productivity
growth can be expected to depress workforce growth,
boost the ratio of Canadians 65 and over to those of
working age (the old-age dependency, or OAD ratio)
and limit growth in output per person to rates below
past experience.
At first glance, immigration appears a useful tool
to address this challenge. Canada is a major recipient
of immigrants. On average, from 1971 to 1988,
annual net immigration equalled some 0.43 percent
of the resident population; from 1989 to 2007, it
was 0.67 percent. Especially with fertility rates
flagging, immigration has been a major and growing
contributor to growth in the potential workforce,
which we define as the population aged 18 to 64
(Figure 1). 
Since immigrants tend to be younger on average
than people already resident in Canada (Figure 2),
immigration affects the country’s age profile. This
means that immigration can affect such key
measures as the OAD ratio and average output and
income per Canadian. In this Commentary, we
quantify those effects and draw conclusions about
the relative merits of immigration policy in
addressing these challenges. 
On the sobering side, we show that the large
increases in immigration necessary to offset or even
noticeably mitigate the effects of past birth-rate
declines on Canada’s workforce growth, age structure
and income per person are unrealistic – a conclusion
highlighted by the staggering numbers for Canada’s
total population in the terminal year of many of our
projections.
Granted, higher immigration can remedy specific
labour-market gaps and can modestly mitigate the
imminent slowing and eventual reversal in Canada’s
labour-force growth. Still, only improbably huge
increases – for example, near-term, net immigration
rates more than 2.5 times those of the recent past –
can offset the projected impact of natural population
decrease on workforce growth. In contrast to the
terminal population in our Baseline scenario
outlined below – nearly 47 million Canadians in 50
years’ time – the terminal populations in the
forecasts where we rely on immigration to bolster
workforce growth range up to 60 million.
Immigration’s limited practical power to alter
Canada’s demographic future emerges even more
strikingly from our investigations of its impact on
the ratio of potentially retired to potentially working
Canadians. Even huge increases and extreme age
filters can only slow the coming increase in Canada’s
OAD ratio. The terminal populations in the
scenarios where we use immigration to control the
ratio range from over 60 million to over 200 million.
Most striking of all are the projected results of our
attempts to use immigration to influence growth of
output per person. Although increases in
immigration can boost the relative size of the
working-age population, they also add to the total
population among which the resulting increases in
output are divided. As a result, the net effect of a
given rise in immigration is quite weak. For this
reason, our forecasts along these lines tend to
produce explosive population growth, with ludicrous
terminal numbers in the billions or even trillions.
To conclude on a more positive note, we offer
three other potential solutions in contrast to
immigration’s limited effects on workforce growth,
age structure and output per person. They are:
￿ postponing the age at which we generally expect
people to stop participating in the workforce
from 65 to 70;
￿ raising the fertility rate from its current level of
1.54 to its replacement level of 2.1 children per
woman; and
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Figure 1: Contributions of Immigration and Natural Increase to Growth in Canada’s Working-Age
Population






















Figure 2: Age Distribution of Immigrants and Current Canadian Population, 2006
Source: Statistics Canada.Commentary 291 | 3
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￿ boosting productivity growth – the increase in
real output per potential worker – by 1 percent.
While the uncertainties and challenges in these three
options are varied and important, our simulations
reveal them to be more powerful tools to address
Canada’s coming demographic challenges. In
combination – and in contrast to plausible
immigration scenarios – they could boost growth of
output per person well above historical rates.
Notwithstanding our judgment that immigration
benefits immigrants themselves and enriches
Canada in many ways, our scenarios suggest that it
is not, on its own, a promising tool to address the
challenges posed by a slower-growing and aging
population. Canadians should not let misplaced
hopes about immigration distract them from other
demographic and economic measures that can
enhance living standards in a future characterized by
slower workforce growth and a relatively larger
population of seniors.
What Others Have Said
Although much commentary and advocacy treat
immigration as akin to an elixir of youth, research on
immigration at levels that appear economically and
politically feasible has tended to yield more sober
findings. A study by the RAND Corporation (Grant
et al. 2004), for example, concluded that immigra-
tion could do little to mitigate the challenges created
by low fertility in the European Union. Schertmann
(1992) showed that a constant inflow, even of
relatively young immigrants, may not rejuvenate
low-fertility populations. Studies on Canada – for
example UN (2004), Denton and Spencer (2005),
and Guillemette and Robson (2006) – have found
that the momentum of the resident population
largely overwhelms immigration’s influence.
Because most Canadians view immigration
positively, however, and because immigration looks
like an accessible policy lever, its potential
demographic impact is a prominent theme in public
discourse. Policymakers reflect this inclination.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s 2007 Annual
Report on Immigration, for example, refers to “the
demographic reality of aging and shrinking
populations,” inducing all developed countries to
seek immigrants more aggressively (CIC 2007, 6)
and notes: “In a few short years … Canadians who
leave school for the workplace will only offset the
number of retirements. Immigration will therefore
be a key source of workforce growth in the future.”
Strategies and Scenarios
Clearly, immigration’s potential to improve Canada’s
demographic outlook excites the national imagi-
nation. We hope further numerical investigations of
these impacts can illuminate how much or, more
aptly, how little Canadians can realistically expect 
on this front.
Two Strategies
Attempts to influence population growth or age
structure through immigration can work by
modifying the amount or the age of immigrants.
Though conceptually distinct, the two tend to run
together. Since immigrants tend to be younger than
the resident population, they are likelier to be of
working age, or about to “age into” the workforce.
So in the short run, greater numbers of immigrants
will boost the workforce growth rate. Policies
affecting the age profile of immigrants could
amplify this effect.
At the same time, adding immigrants will lower
the average age of the population and mitigate the
increase in the OAD ratio. Again, policies to
accentuate the relative youth of immigrants would
amplify this effect.
When it comes to real per capita income,
considerations similar to those relevant to age profile
apply. Policies that boost growth of the workforce
relative to growth of the population that is either
too young or too old to work will also boost income
per person over time.
Four Scenarios
We now proceed to simulate the effect of various
immigration strategies on workforce growth, the
OAD ratio and output per Canadian. We use a| 4 Commentary 291
C.D. Howe Institute
Assumptions
Life Expectancy at Birth (years): 1997 2007 2017 2027 2037 2047 2057
Male 75.7 78.0 79.0 80.0 81.0 82.0 82.5
Female 81.3 82.7 83.7 84.7 85.7 86.7 87.5
Total Fertility Rate (per woman) 1.55 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54
Net International Migration
(as % of resident population) 0.54 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66
Results
Total Population (millions) 29.9 33.0 36.1 39.2 41.6 43.5 45.2
Old-age Dependency Ratio 65+/18-64
(%) 19.2 20.5 25.7 35.3 40.8 43.0 46.3
Table 1: Baseline Scenario: Assumptions and Results
Note: Values for 1997 are actual, for 2007 are inputs into model from latest available data, and for 2017-2057 are projections.
Sources: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.
Box 1: Selecting Younger Immigrants
The younger age profile of immigrants in the Younger scenario, in Figure 3, is illustrative rather than the
product of any specific proposed policy change. It supposes a filter that tilts immigration policy strongly
towards parents aged 20-29 with children. A stronger focus on refugees, the youngest category and on
the economic class, combined with fewer family-class immigrants, who tend to be older, would produce
this result, as would revising the points system to give greater weight to ages in this range. The Younger
scenario is emphatically not something we recommend: it does not completely eliminate older
immigrants, but might represent an extreme of what is feasible.*
Younger Actual
















Figure 3: Age Distribution of Immigrants: Actual and Hypothetical Younger
* In the Independent and Skilled Worker categories, the current point system gives a maximum of 10 points to people aged 21-49, with two points deducted per year either side of that
range, and zero for people 16 and under or 54 and older.
Sources: Statistics Canada, authors’ figures.Commentary 291 | 5
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model maintained at the C.D. Howe Institute
(derived from ILO 2002) to project Canada’s future
population based on some straightforward
assumptions (Table 1 summarizes some key
assumptions and results in our Baseline scenario):
￿ Each province’s total fertility rate remains at its
2006 level through the projection period.
￿ Life expectancy at birth by sex rises at rates akin
to those in Statistics Canada’s “medium”
assumption for improvement. 
￿ A constant share of the population of each age
and sex emigrates every year.1
We consider four immigration scenarios:
1. A “Baseline,” in which the annual (gross) flow
of immigrants remains at the 2007 level relative
to the resident population (0.7 percent), with
the same age distribution observed from 2003
to 2007.
2. A “More” scenario, in which (gross)
immigration annually rises to 1 percent of the
resident population, with the same age
distribution observed from 2003 to 2007.
3. A “Younger” scenario, in which immigration
continues at its 2007 rate, but with a younger
age structure, as shown in Figure 3 (see Box 1).
4. A “More and Younger” scenario, in which
immigration rises to 1 percent of resident
population and has the younger age structure
shown in Figure 3.
Impacts on Workforce Growth
Figure 4 shows the actual growth of the workforce
since 1972, with projections through the year 2058
in the four scenarios. The Baseline projects a
continued decline in workforce growth, with the
baby boomers’ exit from the workforce stalling
growth in the 2020s. Workforce growth resumes in
the 2030s and then stabilizes near 0.3 percent
around 2050, with net immigration and natural
1 Emigration averages 0.06 percent of the resident population in all our scenarios. Younger immigrants appear likelier to emigrate again (Aydemir and
























































































Figure 4: Growth in Working Age Population
Sources: Statistics Canada and authors’ calculations.| 6 Commentary 291
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increase at current fertility rates marginally
exceeding age-related departures. In this Baseline,
Canada’s total population rises from about 33
million at the start to almost 47 million in 2058.2
The other three scenarios illustrated in Figure 4
show how immigration can affect workforce growth.
The More scenario yields a growth rate of 0.8
percent annually until 2058, consistently higher
than the Baseline rate, though still averaging below
all but the weakest growth years in the past quarter
century. In this scenario, total population would
exceed 55 million by 2058.3
Workforce growth in the Younger scenario
initially dips below the Baseline rate due to the
arrival of many under-18s. As the first wave of these
younger people enters the workforce, the growth
rate stabilizes in the 2050s, at a level marginally
above that in the More scenario. Population in this
scenario is just shy of 50 million by 2058.
Even the More and Younger scenario cannot
avoid a dip in workforce growth below 0.5 percent
annually within the next two decades, before growth
in the working-age population stabilizes later at rates
closer to those of recent history. Total population at
the end of this scenario is about 60 million.
Impacts on Old-Age Dependency
The dependency ratio has been rising since 1971,
but will start a steeper climb around 2012, as
increasing numbers of baby boomers pass age 65.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the OAD ratio since
1971, along with projections through 2058 in the
four scenarios.
In the Baseline, with immigration rising from just
under 245,000 in 2009 to over 340,000 in 2058,
and having an age structure like that of the recent
past, the OAD ratio rises by almost 0.8 percentage



























































































Figure 5: Evolution of the Old-Age Dependency Ratio
Sources: Statistics Canada, authors’ calculations.
2 Statistics Canada’s population projection under a “medium growth, recent migration trends” scenario is 43 million by 2056 (Statistics Canada
CANSIM Table 052-0004).
3 Statistics Canada projects 51 million people in 2056 with 1 percent immigration (Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 052-0004).points annually until 2030. Although its climb then
slows, as the rapidly falling post-baby boom
birthrate shrinks the number of people passing age
65, the ratio still keeps rising. So the total increase
over the projection period is from about 21 percent
today to over 45 percent by 2058. 
In the More scenario, population aging is slower
than in the Baseline, but the direction does not
change: the OAD ratio passes 41 percent by 2058.
In the Younger scenario, the ratio differs little from
that in the Baseline in the early years, while the
under-18s are still maturing to working age. When
they begin entering the workforce in large numbers
after about 2030, the ratio stabilizes, remaining
around 37 percent through to 2058. 
Finally, the More and Younger scenario shows the
combined effect of both changes. This scenario
would see the OAD ratio rising from 21 percent
today to more than 35 percent by the mid-2030s. It
then falls again, ending the projection at just under
32 percent. Therefore, in a numerical sense, a very
aggressive pursuit of younger immigrants could
prevent the OAD ratio rising above a peak of about
35 percent some 25 years from now. Before
considering the moral and other problems of this
scenario, however, we note that the ratio under these
scenarios would still rise much faster between 2006
and 2030 than at any time over the past 35 years. 
Impacts on Real Per Capita 
Income Growth
To complete the picture, we consider similar
projections for growth in real income per person.
These projections require an assumption about
productivity, or growth of real output per potential
worker.4 For transparency, we use a very simple
assumption: that output per working-age person
Commentary 291 | 7
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Figure 6: Projected Growth Rates in Real GDP per Capita – Decadal Averages
Sources: Statistics Canada, authors’ calculations.
4 Assuming equivalent growth in output and income per potential worker means that we implicitly assume no change in net factor payments abroad per
potential worker. Changes in immigration on the scale we consider might affect Canada’s net external balance and comparative rates of return. Many of
our scenarios are so implausible, however, that elaborating those effects seems speculative to the point of irrelevancy, so we assume that output and
incomes grow in step with each other.C.D. Howe Institute
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Figure 7: Immigration Rate Required to Maintain 1.3% Growth in Working-Age Population
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Figure 8: Immigration Rate Required to Stabilize Old-Age Dependency Ratio
Sources: Statistics Canada, authors’ calculations.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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increases over the next half-century at the same rate
of just over 2 percent that it increased during the
1995-to-2007 stable-inflation period when the gap
between actual output and the economy’s
productive potential was, on average, almost exactly
zero. Figure 6 presents the average projected growth
rate per decade, along with actual average decadal
growth rates since 1972.
In the Baseline, real output per person grows at
an average annual rate of 1.71 percent from 2009 to
2058. The depressing impact of the retiring baby
boom generation comes in the 2020s. While growth
is faster in the other three scenarios, the differences
with the Baseline are so small that they only show in
the second decimal place: the More, Younger, and
More and Younger scenarios show growth in real
output per person of 1.76 percent, 1.75 percent and
1.79 percent, respectively. In the scenarios targeting
younger immigrants, the large numbers who enter
the country while still below working age
temporarily reinforce the dip in growth, before
boosting the rate later on. 
Target-Based Policies
Our four scenarios do not exhaust the range of
conceivable immigration-policy responses to slower
workforce growth, population aging and less robust
increases in real income per person. One
informative approach to confronting these
challenges is to approach them from the other end,
picking a demographic or economic target and
asking what immigration policy could achieve it.
Targeting Workforce Growth
What immigration level, for example, would
maintain growth in the Canadian workforce at the
1.2 percent rate that prevailed from 2004 to 2008?
Again, we can think of two routes to achieving this
result: increasing numbers, which we call the
“Workforce-Target More” scenario, or changing
both numbers and immigrants’ age distribution, the
“Workforce-Target More and Younger” scenario.
Since a change in age distribution alone, with
unchanged total numbers, cannot achieve the target,
we leave that option out.
The rates of immigration needed under these two
scenarios, with a comparison to the Baseline, are
illustrated in Figure 7. Achieving the target
workforce growth rate requires an immediate and
large increase in immigration: in both scenarios,
immigration rates double in the next decade.
The higher initial jump under the Workforce-
Target More and Younger scenario occurs because it
brings in more under-18s. As they mature into the
working-age population, the immigration required
to maintain workforce growth falls below that
envisaged in the Workforce-Target More scenario.
The pronounced immigration dip in the 2030s in
Workforce-Target More, and the even larger one in
Workforce-Target More and Younger, occurs when
people who immigrated as children begin entering
the workforce, reducing the total numbers required
for workforce growth. Once this maturing-in effect
peters out, required immigration stabilizes at about
double current rates. Canada’s total population in
these scenarios would be over 66 million by 2058.
Targeting the Old-Age Dependency Ratio
In the same spirit, we can ask what immigration rate
would stop the OAD ratio rising above 21.5
percent, the ratio we expect in 2009. Figure 8
illustrates the answer in similar fashion to the
workforce-growth targets. It plots the immigration
required to stabilize the ratio in two parallel
scenarios: one in which only immigration numbers
change, the “OAD-Target More” scenario and one
in which both numbers and age distribution change,
the “OAD-Target More and Younger” scenario. As
with the workforce target, a change in age
distribution alone cannot do the trick.
Under OAD-Target More, the required
immigration increase is immediate and colossal: a
spike to almost 4 percent of the population in the
first five years. The dynamics of reproduction and
aging among the newly arrived immigrants reduces
the required inflow to just over 2 percent of the
population by 2035; then it rises again, surpassing
3.5 percent by 2050. By the end of the period,
Canada’s population would be an eye-popping 210
million.C.D. Howe Institute
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Under OAD-Target More and Younger, with the
younger immigrants in Figure 3, the timeline of
immigration required to cap the OAD ratio initially
resembles OAD-Target More, but the delay in
under-18s reaching working age lifts the early peak
and deepens the later valley. Immigration spikes
even higher initially, drops to zero by 2032, then
rockets up again after 2045. By the end of the
period, Canada’s population would pass 127
million. The scale and volatility of immigration is
no more realistic in this scenario than in OAD-
Target More. 
These huge numbers do not result merely from
too weak an age filter on immigration. Even a
ferociously stringent filter cannot stabilize the OAD
ratio. Suppose, for example, that all new immigrants
were equally distributed in the age-range 20 to 24,
for an average age of 22. This scenario appears in
Figure 8 as OAD-Target Ages 20-24. Because the
OAD ratio defines older people as age 65 or
beyond, such a 20-24 filter would ensure that every
single immigrant lowers the ratio on arrival and for
at least 40 years afterwards. Even so, immigration
would have to spike over 2 percent initially and
remain that high for another 20 years. Between
2012 and 2030 under that scenario, Canada would
admit an average of 1.7 million 20- to 24-year-olds
annually, compared to about 24,000 in that age
range now. Terminal population in this scenario is
86 million.
Targeting Growth of Real Income 
As an alternative to targeting demographic variables,
we consider trying to boost growth of real income –
assuming, as described above, that output per
potential worker grows at the same rate as during
the 1995-2007 period. The most compelling target
is growth in income per person, since that is what
matters for average living standards. As hinted by
the very small differences in per-person income
growth among the scenarios already described,
however, immigration is a very weak lever for
changing income per person. This is because even
with strong age filters to enhance the impact of
higher immigration on the relative size of the
workforce, adding people to the population spreads
any resulting boost to output over a larger number
of potential claimants. Attempts to boost growth
rates of income per person in our simulations
produce explosive population numbers that mount
rapidly into the billions or even trillions, so we do
not pursue this targeting option further here.
To round out our exploration of targeting, we
instead explore the implications for real income per
person of aiming at a less challenging target such as
growth in aggregate real income, or GDP. We use
both models with higher numbers of immigrants
(Output-Target More) and one with higher
numbers as well as younger ages (Output-Target
More and Younger) to achieve the GDP growth
target.
Figure 9, analogously to Figure 6, shows the
average projected growth rate per decade in real
income per capita when we use immigration as a
tool to raise future growth in total real GDP to the
same average rate that prevailed from 1995 to 2007.
The average per-person income growth rates from
2009 to 2058 for Output-Target More and Output-
Target More and Younger are both 1.76 percent  –
somewhat higher than the Baseline rate of 1.71
percent. 
In the Output-Target More and Younger scenario,
output growth dips below the Baseline until the large
number of young immigrants “age into” the
workforce. We also look at the effects of our extreme
age filter where only individuals aged 20 to 24 are
admitted (Output Target Ages 20-24). This yields
higher growth in income per person, with an average
gain of 1.80 percent over the 2009-2058 period.
None of these scenarios, however, prevents the
projected decline in output growth rates in the 2020s
as the resident population ages. Canada’s population
in the final year of the output target scenarios using
age filters is between 65 million and 70 million.
Discussion
So far, these simulations have made modest
concessions to realism. Noting all the caveats about,
and possible consequences of, immigration policies
such as those just illustrated would require a
substantial book. But several nonetheless merit
highlighting: caveats about large changes inIndependent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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immigration numbers, their impact on the domestic
population, and concern where such flows of
immigrants would come from.
Numbers and Age Profile Are Not
Independent
To begin, we repeat that immigrant numbers and
age-structure are conceptually distinct, but tend to
vary together. As Beach et al. (2006) document,
factors such as the state of the economy, the
emphasis on different immigration streams, and the
point scores awarded potential economic-class
immigrants affect both volumes and the average ages
of immigrants. The tendency for numbers and age
to vary together illustrates a more general point:
other priorities for immigration policy do not figure
in our simulations. Ignoring older immigrants when
aggressively seeking younger ones, for example,
would impede family unification and reduce average
immigrant education and work experience.
Another caveat in any discussion focused on
growth, relative size and output of the workforce is
that newly arrived immigrants have lower
employment rates than Canadian-born
contemporaries. Analysis of population groups from
the 2007 Labour Force Survey (Figure 10) shows
that the employment rate of immigrants, when
compared to the employment rates of people born
in Canada, is a function both of age and length of
time since arrival (Gilmore 2008). Although
immigrants in the 55-and-up age group who have
been in Canada for more than five years have higher
employment rates than Canadian-born
contemporaries, this effect is small in economic
terms, since employment rates among 55-and-ups
are low to begin with. More important, the
employment rates of younger and more recent
immigrants are below those of Canadian-born
contemporaries. Overall, then, our simulations
overstate the immediate impacts of higher and





Output Target More and Younger




















Figure 9: Projected Growth Rates in Real GDP per Capita – Decadal Averages
Sources: Statistics Canada, authors’ calculations.Judging the Scale of Potential Flows:
Canada’s Absorptive Capacity
Clearly, Canada can take in substantial immigration.
At around one-fifth, the share of Canada’s
population born outside the country puts it fifth
among 29 OECD countries (OECD 2009).
Nevertheless, changes in the volume and/or age
structure of immigration on the scale contemplated
in these simulations raise some questions.
Expressing immigration relative to the total
resident population is misleading, for example,
when using immigration to change the population’s
age structure. If Canada recruited younger
immigrants far more aggressively, resident young
people would notice such impacts as intensified
competition in the job market. The volumes of
immigration in our simulations are huge, not just
compared to past experience, but compared to the
resident population in the relevant age range. For
example, the population aged 20 to 24 is now about
2.3 million. In the admittedly extreme OAD-Target
More and Younger scenario, the annual inflow
would equal more than 10 percent of the
population of contemporaries already in Canada, as
opposed to less than 1 percent in the Baseline
scenario. Such an accelerated inflow would severely
depress wages in that age group.
No less arresting are the changes in Canada’s
population under other scenarios explored here. In
our Baseline scenario, population falls slightly short
of 47 million in 50 years’ time – a figure that some
might say would overstress the carrying capacity of
the country’s land, cities and infrastructure. In the
More and Younger scenarios, the terminal
populations are 56 million and 60 million. In the
targeting scenarios presented here, the terminal
populations range from 65 million to over 200
million; in those not presented where growth in per-
person incomes was the target, the numbers were
orders of magnitude higher yet. We doubt any
C.D. Howe Institute
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Figure 10: Employment Rates: Immigrants vs. People Born in Canada, 2007
Source: Statistics Canada.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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appreciable number of Canadians would support
strategies to multiply the country’s population by
two, three or 10 times, even if such increases held
out the prospect of maintaining growth of the
workforce, stabilizing the dependency ratio or
maintaining growth in living standards.
Judging the Scale of Potential 
Flows: Source
Another perspective on the scale of these imaginary
immigration flows comes from considering their
potential source. As international competition for
skilled labour increases, so does the range of
alternative destinations. The world contains billions
of young people, but the partial data on migration
by age that exist suggest that Canada’s proposed
draws would be huge compared to the numbers that
actually cross national borders in a given year.
Indeed, in recent years, only some 330,000
people in the 20- to 24-year-old age range have
immigrated to 12 major countries, including
Canada.5 As a very rough approximation in the
OAD-Target More scenario, Canada would have to
divert roughly two-thirds of all the people in this age
range who currently go to 11 countries that
compete with Canada for such immigrants. For
Canada to “sell” itself as a destination for a much
larger share of young immigrants would clearly
require enormous effort. As well, to achieve this
objective, the standards applied to the economic
migrants within this age range would surely fall. 
Three Alternatives: Later Retirement,
Higher Fertility and Faster Productivity
Growth
For a final perspective on immigration as a boost to
the workforce and a way of maintaining the youth-
fulness of Canada’s population structure, we compare
it to three other workforce/demographic tools.
Later Retirement
One way to increase Canada’s potential workforce is
by pushing back the normal retirement age.
Advances in longevity and shifts toward later
workforce entry and less physically demanding
occupations mean that the equivalent of working
until age 65 in 1970 is now working until at least
age 70. Yet, for a variety of reasons, people are
retiring earlier than they did in 1970.6 A later
average or standard retirement age would provide a
medium-term boost to workforce growth. To put
some numbers behind this straightforward point, we
use the Baseline projection and move the age at
which the population is assumed to become inactive
to 70 from 65, raising it three months every year
between 2009 and 2028.
Higher Fertility
A second, admittedly much more speculative,
change would be a rise in the fertility rate. Because
pro-natal policies are uncertain in their impact, not
to mention politically controversial, we use a simple
benchmark: a rise in the total number of births
expected over a typical woman’s lifetime from the
current national value of 1.54 to 2.10, which is
approximately the replacement rate, over the next
10 years.7
Impact of Later Retirement and 
Higher Fertility
The impact of later retirement and higher fertility
on growth in the working-age population, which by
the end of the shift in retirement age, would be
defined as 18 to 69, appears in Figure 11. The
Figure also contrasts those growth rates with growth
of the working-age population in the Baseline as
well as in the More and Younger scenarios.
5 See www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/countrydata/country.cfm (accessed February 2009). Data on migration flows are extremely spotty. For
this illustrative exercise, we took the values from the latest year available for each country.
6 For examples of the early-retirement incentives built into pension plans, see Schirle (2008).
7 The replacement rate is the number of children that a couple would need to have to exactly replace themselves in the population: two plus a small
increment to allow for the fact that some female children do not live long enough to bear children of their own.| 14 Commentary 291
The later retirement age would raise the growth
rate of the working-age population relative to the
Baseline for a couple of decades. By 2030, the
lengthening of normal working life would be
complete and the average growth rates would no
longer differ appreciably from those in the Baseline
scenario. Since timing of retirement does not affect
the size of the population, the projected terminal
population in the Later Retirement scenario is the
same as that in the Baseline.
Rising fertility rates naturally take time to affect
the growth rate of the working-age population.
Once the additional newborns begin to enter the
workforce some 18 years later, however, their impact
is considerable. Under this rising fertility scenario,
the growth rate for the working-age population
accelerates for almost a decade starting in the late
2020s, and averages not far short of 1 percent
annually through the end of the projection period.
Terminal population in this scenario is 56 million
(Table 2).
The impact of later retirement and higher fertility
are interesting to look at together as one combined
scenario. The transitions just described would mean
that the impact of higher fertility would pick up
about the same time that the impact of later
retirement is tailing off, meaning that together, they
would have an immediate and sustained impact on
Canada’s potential workforce. 
What of the OAD ratio? Figure 12 compares the
evolution of the OAD ratio under the redefinition
involved in the later retirement scenario with the
evolution of the ratio assuming higher fertility. It
also contrasts these ratios to their counterparts in the
Baseline and More Younger Scenarios.
Not surprisingly, later retirement reduces the
OAD ratio relative to the Baseline in the near term,
and both delays and mutes its eventual rise. Higher
fertility has no impact until the new youngsters
reach working age, but then caps the ratio around
40 percent after 2020.
When viewed together, the influence of higher





























































































Figure 11: Projected Growth in Working-Age Population with Gradual Rise in Retirement Age or 
Fertility Rate
Sources: Statistics Canada, authors’ calculations.Commentary 291 | 15
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Figure 12: Projected OAD Ratio with Gradual Rise in Retirement Age or Fertility Rate
Sources: Statistics Canada, authors’ calculations.
Table 2: Terminal Population Numbers
Source: Authors’ calculations.




More and Younger 59.8
OAD Target More 210.0
OAD Target More and Younger 127.4
OAD Target Ages 20-24 85.5
Workforce Target More  66.6
Workforce Target More and Younger 66.0
Output Target More 69.8
Output Target More and Younger 68.9
Output Target Ages 20-24 64.5
Higher Fertility  55.6| 16 Commentary 291
of later retirement on the growth of the OAD ratio
had ceased, resulting in a ratio consistently even
lower than in the More and Younger Scenario
throughout the projection period. 
Faster Productivity Growth
Of course, improvements in productivity would
directly improve the outlook for living standards,
whatever the underlying patterns of workforce
growth and OAD. For our final comparison, we
illustrate the difference that 1 percent faster
productivity growth would make to our Baseline
scenario and, for the sake of holding out an
ambitious, but not completely unrealistic alternative
future, how the same improvement in productivity
growth would change the Later Retirement and
Higher Fertility scenarios. 
For our Faster Productivity scenario, we raise the
growth rate of output per worker above the 2
percent average improvement in our baseline,
adding about 0.1 percentage point per year for a
decade and then leaving the rate constant at about 3
percent thereafter. Like later retirement, faster
productivity growth does not affect total
population, so terminal population in this scenario
is again the same as in the Baseline. 
Figure 13 shows the effect on growth of income
per person and compares it to the Baseline as well as
the Later Retirement and Higher Fertility scenarios.
The effects of higher productivity are striking: the
average growth rate in per-person income over the
2009-2058 period in this scenario would be 2.62
percent, compared with 1.71 percent in the
Baseline, 1.92 percent under Later Retirement and
only 1.66 percent under Higher Fertility, which
increases the size of the population among which
aggregate income must be shared. A very ambitious
“combination-of-good-things” scenario with higher
fertility, retirement age and productivity yields
average growth rates of 2.75 percent in income per
person between 2009 and 2058.
These results show the power a modest and
gradual change in the normal retirement pattern has
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Figure 13: Projected Growth Rates in Real GDP per Capita – Decadal Averages
Sources: Statistics Canada, authors’ calculations.Commentary 291 | 17
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comparison with significant changes in both the
volume and age-structure of immigration. An
increase in the fertility rate is a far less certain, and
far more controversial, object of policy. Over time,
however, it too would have tremendous power to
change the age structure of Canada’s population, on
a par with some of the more extreme immigration
scenarios. 
Clearly, faster productivity growth holds the
greatest promise for raising living standards in the
years ahead. Boosting productivity growth is a
complicated endeavour, and many of the means for
achieving it are also politically controversial. Unlike
later retirement, however, faster productivity growth
involves an ongoing, rather than a one-time, shift.
And unlike higher fertility, it increases incomes
without increasing the number of people among
whom the higher incomes must be divided.
Conclusion
The message of these simulations is that we should
not overstate the contribution immigration can
make to maintaining workforce growth, keeping
Canada young and boosting living standards.
Workforce growth is the easier of the two
demographic variables to address with immigration.
Even so, immigration rates equal to 1 percent of the
already resident population would not prevent
Canada’s workforce growth dipping to historic lows
in the 2020s. Furthermore, the immigration levels
required – even with major efforts to attract a larger
share of younger people – to maintain workforce
growth at current rates would be well outside the
realm of economic or political feasibility.
An aging population is an even more difficult
challenge. Increasing immigration to 1 percent of
population per year without varying its age
distribution would slow the rise in the OAD ratio
only marginally. And raising immigration to this
level while recruiting younger immigrants
aggressively would still not prevent an historic rise in
the ratio. Only extreme and unpalatable policies,
such as rapidly increasing immigration to well over
3 percent for decades could come close to stabilizing
the OAD ratio. 
Per-person income growth is the most difficult
target of all. The inescapable consequence of larger
numbers of arrivals is a larger population among
which to share any resulting increase in aggregate
output. Even very large changes in immigration
flows or extreme policies to shift the age-structure of
immigrants cannot affect future growth of income
per person by more than a few tenths of a
percentage point. Furthermore, attempts to
maintain per-person income growth at historic rates
through immigration alone produce preposterous
population numbers. Indeed, the contrast between
the projected populations for Canada in the final
year of the projections illustrates vividly how weak a
tool immigration is, on its own, to decisively shape
Canada’s demographic and economic future.
If Canadians are prepared for major policy
reforms to mitigate the impact of a slower-growing
and aging population on Canada’s workforce, age
structure and income growth, other tools have – at
least in a numeric sense – at least as much promise
as immigration. Delaying the normal age of
retirement can help both workforce growth and the
OAD ratio in the near term. Higher fertility would
help achieve both goals in the next generation and
beyond, and faster productivity growth will do more
for real income growth than any conceivable
immigration strategy.
Even if Canadians do choose higher immigration,
and even if they choose to target younger
immigrants for demographic reasons, such measures
need to be complemented with other policies to
delay retirement, raise fertility and boost
productivity if Canada truly wishes to transform its
demographic and economic future.| 18 Commentary 291
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